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Abstract
Absenteeism is affected by the sickness benefit system. Countries with generous compensation
during sick leaves also experience high numbers of sick leave. Sick leaves may vary over the
business cycle due to unemployment disciplining effects or changes in labour force
composition. The latter hypothesis maintains that sickness may be pro-cyclical due to
employment of “marginal” workers with poorer health when demand increases. Using
individual records of labour force participants in Norway, we investigate the explanatory
factors behind differing spells of work absence at different stages of the business cycle. We
find no indication that new entrants explain increases in absence, on the other hand workers
who stay in the labour force increase absences when the economy improves. Thus there is
some evidence that unemployment has a disciplining effect..
JEL classification number: J22, J33, J38
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1. Introduction.
Expenditures associated with sickness absence have led to serious concerns in many
countries. In European welfare states, an increase in sick payments causes fiscal problems for
often highly indebted governments. Simultaneously, industry suffers losses when workers are
absent. This situation has triggered a debate about what are the causes of work absences, and
what measures that should be initiated to combat an alleged negative trend. Some countries,
like the Netherlands, Sweden, and Germany, have initiated changes in the sick payment
schemes, which reduce the economic compensation to be received during sick leaves. Most
economists will agree that this will reduce the incentives to stay away from work, at least to
the degree that some sick leaves are to be termed illegitimate. On the other hand, it is
interesting to observe that for most counties, irrespective of generosity of sick payment
systems, absenteeism seems to vary according to the same pattern over business cycles and
between sectors of the economy.
The overall work absence over the business cycle may be affected by the behaviour of
each worker and their characteristics. For instance, according to the efficiency wage theory,
Shapiro and  Stiglitz (1984), shirking may be more frequent in booming periods since
workers’ fear of becoming unemployed due to both legitimate absences and illegitimate
shirking is low in such periods. This is confirmed in several studies for different countries, see
e.g. Allen (1981a), Kenyon and Dawkins (1989), Drago and Wooden (1992), Johansson and
Palme (1996) and Dyrstad (1997, 1999). On the other hand, higher demand is in itself likely
to affect the health status of the workers, and thereby increase legitimate sickness absenteeism
in booming periods. Another reason for variations in absenteeism over the business cycles,
can to be found from the changing composition of the labour force. As pointed out by Allen
(1981b) and Barmby and Treble (1991), employers may find it profitable to screen workers
and primarily offer contracts that are preferable for the healthiest workers. Then, when
economic conditions improve (worsen), the most sick and unhealthy workers, marginal
workers, are the last to get a job (the first to loose their jobs). Similarly, marginal workers
may serve as a reserve, to be called on when workers become scarce. This latter effect, often
termed composition effects or marginalisation of the labour force, will therefore lead to a
higher incidence of work absence in booming periods.
Empirical analyses of these competing hypotheses are important, because they may
give valuable information concerning the design of sick leave schemes. This design will again
affect the overall expenditure associated with work absenteeism. In this paper, we will use2
sickness absence data from Norway to distinguish between these two competing hypotheses,
efficiency wage, and composition. Different from most other countries, Norway has a 100%
replacement ratio during absence caused by sickness. There is an income ceiling, at
approximately  NOK 250 000, above which no additional benefit is paid. However, most
larger firms and the public sector will compensate the workers earning above the income
ceiling, so that the 100% replacement ratio is relevant for the bulk of the work force. Thus,
the Norwegian system is such that most workers will receive full wage for a sickness spell
lasting up to one year. This high replacement ratio may give incentives to stay away from
work even though it may not be strictly necessary, and to stay away for longer periods.
Expenditures associated with absenteeism are significant in Norway, and have
therefore led to serious concerns about the Norwegian sick leave scheme and its incentives.
According to the Norwegian Employers’ Association, Norway has more than 50% higher
work absenteeism than the other Scandinavian countries. The absence due to sickness was
calculated to cost NOK 28 billion in 1997 as measured by the amount received by workers
during work absences.
1 This amounts to 2.6% of  GDP. The payment of sickness benefits in
Norway is shared between the employer and the Social Insurance system. The employers pay
sickness benefits for the first 14 days, and Social Insurance covers sickness benefits
exceeding two weeks, and up to one year.
2 Sickness benefits paid from the Social Insurance in
1997 amounted to NOK 15 billion. The remaining part, NOK 13 billion, was the employers’
share.
In Norway, both short run and long term sick leaves, together with sickness leave
payments, have increased considerably during the latter part of the nineties. This increase has
followed an increase in economic growth and reduction in unemployment. It is notable that
after surging in 1993, unemployment has decreased, while sickness absences did not start to
increase before 1995. There are also large variations according to occupational groups and
industries. Absenteeism is higher in the public sector, and in particular in occupations related
to health and education. All these observations are consistent with a theory stipulating that
costs of staying away from work are smaller when unemployment is low and job protection is
high. However, this pattern is also consistent with the alternative hypothesis that sicker and
more marginal workers are employed when economic conditions improve. A Norwegian
study (RTV (1998)) gives some evidence that at least marginal male workers have a higher
tendency for sick leaves than more established workers. A policy consequence of importance
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2 As of 1998, the employer’s period is increased to 16 days.3
is thus whether the business cycle development indicates a cyclical demand for work related
health measures, or whether it is just shirking and a periodically more lenient behaviour that
account for the variation in number of work days lost.
The main question that we try to answer in this paper is: Are changes in sick leaves
explained by variation in behaviour, or is it the composition of the work force which is of
most importance? Furthermore, what drives the alleged business cycle dependence of sickness
absenteeism? Only sick leaves covered by the Social Insurance are considered, i.e. more long
term sick leaves exceeding two weeks. We compare two years at different stages in the
business cycle: 1992 when unemployment was high, and 1995, a year when unemployment
was clearly on its way down. The composition effects are isolated by comparing sickness
probabilities for workers with a low participation in the labour market (less than 500 hours) in
year t-2, t = (1992, 1995), to the rest of the workers. Workers who were under education, or
too young to participate in the labour force, are excluded from both these latter sub-samples.
We utilise the very rich KIRUT database, which contains detailed individual information for a
random 10% sample of the Norwegian population aged 16-67. From  KIRUT we extracted
some 80 000 workers in 1992 and in 1995. The data set contains job-related information like
income and absenteeism above two weeks. There is also a lot of background information
about the participants, e.g. gender, age and former employment history, in addition to
information about the sector for which the individuals are working.
The paper is organised as follows. In the next section, we give a brief theoretical
background and overview over some literature of relevance for this study. In Section 3, we
give an institutional overview, with emphasis on the sickness benefit system and development
of unemployment and absenteeism during the nineties. Then in Section 4, we present the data
and how they are prepared for this particular purpose. The empirical specifications are
discussed in Section 5. In Section 6, we report the results, and some concluding remarks are
offered in the final section.
2. Theoretical background.
It is common in economics to consider the decision of being absent as resulting from utility
maximising. A worker maximises a utility function where consumption and leisure are
arguments. Each day a worker makes a decision whether to work or stay away from their job,
see e.g. Brown and Sessions (1996) and Johansson and Palme (1996). It is generally assumed
that leisure is a normal good. Therefore increased income will increase demand for leisure, or4
in our framework the demand for absences. The wage rate works differently. Given the
replacement ratio, a higher wage rate makes absences more costly but simultaneously income
increases. The total effect is ambiguous. It is however common to make assumptions on the
utility function so that the wage rate effect is unambiguously negative on the demand for
absences.
The marginal rate of substitution between leisure and consumption depends on the
individual’s health state, see Barmby, Sessions and Treble (1994). In particular it is assumed
that leisure is relatively more valued when a person is sick. The individual or household
budget constraint is influenced by the compensation the person receives when sick. A 100%
replacement ratio gives an incentive for workers to stay away when sick, and also to be absent
for invalid reasons (‘shirking’), see Dunn and Youngblood (1986). This moral hazard problem
is well know within social insurance situations, Whinston (1983), since it is generally hard to
observe whether a person claiming that an insurance situation has arisen, really fulfils the
stated conditions. A strand of literature that explicitely addresses this issue is the ‘efficiency
wage theory’, Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984). The main point here is that a workers’ incentives to
shirk on the job depends on the relative wage received within the firm, and the firm’s
monitoring of its workers. Provided the latter is imperfect, a worker may shirk when wage
opportunities outside the firm improves, and when unemployment is reduced. Thus, with
(full) wage compensation during sickness, and assumedly imperfect monitoring, claimed
sickness benefits will follow the business cycle, and be negatively related to the wage.
Simultaneously, when economic conditions improve, it is reasonable that more
marginal workers are attracted to the labour force. The resulting changes in the composition
of the labour force over the business cycle can be explained by demand side behaviour in the
labour market, Barmby and Treble (1991). Firms may recruit people based on former sickness
records which are observable to the firms, experience rating. Thus, the firms will try primarily
to hire workers with few and short spells of absence. However, when activity in the economy
increases, together with firms’ demand for more workers, it may be hard to find the workers
with the best records. The firms will then have to recruit workers with a poorer experience in
absenteeism. These may be workers that are more prone to shirking but it is as likely that it is
workers with poorer health and thereby a higher probability of becoming sick and being
eligible for sickness benefits. Thus, if the firms are using an active policy of recruiting
workers depending on experience rating, there will be composition effects in observed
absenteeism, which also gives rise to a pro-cyclical development of absences. The pro-
cyclicality can also be explained by supply side factors. The last recruited workers are likely5
to be those with the highest relative marginal valuation of leisure, indicating that a smaller
wage differential or lower rate of unemployment would give them incentives to absent from a
job, irrespective whether this is considered valid or invalid.
3. Institutional Background.
Sickness benefits in Norway is organised under the National Insurance Administration (NIA),
which also encompasses unemployment insurance, disability insurance, and old age pensions.
All employees who have been with the same employer for at least two weeks, are covered by
sickness insurance. Once this requirement is filled, coverage is 100 per cent from the first day.
There is an upper limit, but for typical employees there is little variation in replacement ratios.
The upper limit is 6G, where G is the basic unit used in the pension system, NOK 35 500 in
1992 and NOK 39 230 in 1995. The after tax replacement ratio is 100% for average wages in
manufacturing, and some 90% for wages 25% above that average (NOSOSCO (1992)). A
medical certificate is necessary for absences of more than three days. For sickness spells that last
for more than eight weeks the physician is obliged to provide a more detailed certificate to the
Social Insurance authorities, stating diagnosis and a prognosis assessment.
Sickness benefits are paid by the employer for the first two weeks, and then by the NIA
for a maximum of 50 weeks. If unable to return to work after one year, the options are to apply
for (permanent) disability benefits or for (temporary) rehabilitation benefits. These benefits are
comparable to old age pensions and considerably lower than sickness benefits. Being related to
earnings history, not only current wages, the replacement ratios will also vary more across
individuals. Payment of premia for sickness insurance is also part of the Social Insurance
system, based on a pay-as-you-go system. Workers pay a given share of income as a ‘sickness
insurance’ tax, and employers contribute through a payroll tax on total wage bill. There is no
experience rating, and firms are not allowed to use sickness as reasons for laying off some
employees.
NIA expenses are sizeable. In 1995, the last year covered in this analysis, NIA social
insurance payments totalled  NOK 126.2 billion, about 13% of  GDP. Sickness benefits
contributed 9% of NIA outlays. There has been an interesting development in sickness
absenteeism, i.e. paid sickness leave, during the nineties. In Figure 1, we see the average
number of sickness days per employee (the bold line and the right axis). The numbers are
calculated by counting the overall number of sickness days exceeding the first 14 days that the6
employers have to pay, and divide this number by the number of employees. Note that this
figure does not give any information about the development of shorter sickness spells, only
those exceeding 14 days. Furthermore, state employees are excluded.
(Figure 1 in about here)
The yearly average number of sickness days, also reported in Figure 1, has its
minimum in 1994. However, if we hold this figure together with the unemployment rates,
given in Figure 2, we see that there is a lag between the average number of sickness days per
employee and the cyclical movements in the unemployment rates.
(Figure 2 in about here)
The unemployment rates start to decrease one year before the number of sickness days start to
rise. The lag seems to be even longer if we hold the unemployment rates and the duration of
the longer sickness spells together. The length of the spells decreased until its turning point in
1995. The significant lags between the unemployment rates and the sickness absence is
consistent with the hypothesis that increased absence is due to composition effects. In
addition, it is possible that the pattern comes from more stress and increased speed at the work
place. If on the other hand the shirking hypothesis dominates the composition effects, we
would expect unemployment and absenteeism to mirror each other more immediately. On the
other hand, it may be that workers are more careful during the early stage of an upturn.
4. Data
4.1 Data Sources
The analysis draws on data from the KIRUT database.
3 The base contains detailed individual
information on socio-economic background, labour market participation, and social insurance
payments for a random 10% sample of the Norwegian population aged 16-67 (the total
sample exceeds 300 000 individuals).
Our sample includes a 50% selection of the individuals that occupy a job from
January 1, 1992 until December 31, 1992, and a 50% selection of the individuals that occupy
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a job from January 1, 1995 until December 31, 1995.
4 The drawings are done by selecting the
50% lowest identification-code of the individuals the relevant years. Note, however, that the
id-code is unrelated to any characteristics of the individuals.
 All state employees are excluded
from our sample since there is no information about sickness periods or payments for this
category of workers. After excluding individuals with missing variables and self-employed,
we end up with final samples of 82 349 individuals in 1992, and 88 354 individuals in 1995.
We construct several sub-samples. The first one covers those individuals that are included in
both the 1992 and 1995 yearly samples. We call this the  common sample. This sample
consists of 69.131 individuals. Next we distinguish between what we term marginal workers
and non-marginal workers. Marginal workers are individuals who two years ahead of the year
of investigation, 1992 and 1995 respectively, had a loose relation to the labour force. The
requirement is that they did not work more than 500 hours. However, we are not interested in
those individuals who due to education or age could not be expected to work. Therefore we
exclude individuals with less than two years potential experience (age – years of education –
7). We also exclude workers with a seniority within a firm of more than two years, and those
who are younger than 18 years old in year t. The sub-sample of marginal workers covers 4028
individuals in 1992, and  4783 in 1995.  This sample is compared to a sample of  “non-
marginal”, the full sample except those with less than two years potential experience.
4.2 Variables
The number of days with sickness benefits paid by Social Insurance two years back,
ABSDYS_2, is used as a proxy for the health of the individuals. All the other explanatory
variables are measured the relevant year with the exception of income which is measured at year
t-1. The relevant family variables are: marital status, ( UNMARR), divorced or widowed
(PRE_MARR), gender (WOMAN), and number of children less than 11 years old
(CHILDREN). Further background variables are origin of birth ( NONSCAND = 1 if non-
Scandinavian), years of education (EDUCATIO), age (AGE) and age squared ( AGE_SQR),
where the latter included to take potential non-linearities into consideration. EDUCATIO reflects
the worker’s education, and may also be interpreted as a skill variable. Since we do not have
access to hourly wage rates,  EDUCATIO my serve as proxy for wage rates. In a utility
maximising framework  EDUCATIO should therefore contribute negatively to absences,
assuming substitution effects dominate the income effects. There are other variables that also
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may capture worker ability and wage rates. These are experience, seniority and whether an
individual works part time or full time. Experience (EXPERIEN) is measured as the number of
years with registered pension points (income above 1 G). Seniority (SENIORITY) is given by
the number of years a worker has been within a firm since the beginning of the running contract
period. PARTTIME indicates whether an individual works less than 20 hours a week. Income
previous year (INCOME) have several interpretations. The income variable gives information
about the individual’s income potential the current year, i.e. it is a proxy for expected income. To
account for non-linearities, we include squared income ( INC_SQR).  If absence is costly,
household wealth (WEALTH) and spouse’s income (SPOU_INC) should increase the propensity
of absence. Spouse’s income may also be given an alternative explanation in our model. So
called ‘assortative mating’ would indicate that those with a preference for working (low marginal
valuation of leisure) with find a spouse with similar property. If this is the case, spouse’s income
would affect absenteeism negatively. All income variables (spouse’s income, own income, and
wealth) are measured in NOK 10 000.
Finally, we control for the current labour market situation, location, and industry sectors.
We use unemployment ( UNEMPERC) in the municipality where the individual lives. It
measures register unemployment as a percentage of the registered labour force (employed +
unemployed). The coefficient for  UNEMPERC should be negative if efficiency wage
considerations play a role within a single year. Seven regional dummies represent places of
residence. The Oslo-area serves as the base case. We include six industry sector dummies, with
manufacturing industry serving as the base case.  GOVER_HL is a dummy for the public
(municipal) sector excluding health services, while HEALTSEC is a dummy indicating that the
individual works in the health sector. For ease of exposition, we do not report the results for
these control  variables in the regressions.
(Table 1 about here)
Summary statistics are presented in Table 1. We observe that for the total sample the
sickness probability is lower in 1995 than in 1992. This may seem surprising, since
unemployment is lower in 1995. It is first and foremost for the non-marginal workers and within
the private sector of the economy that absenteeism is reduced. For the common sample it has
increased. The other surprising result is that marginal workers for both years have a lower
absence probability than the non-marginal workers. We note that the sample of marginal workers
is younger than the non-marginal sample, and that they earn considerably less. We also note that
the marginal workers are slightly older in 1995 than in 1992. Furthermore, there are more non-
Scandinavians in this group but this share decreases from 1992 to 1995.9
(Table 2 about here)
Table 2 shows the distributions of absence days (calendar days) for those who have any.
We remind the reader that our records only include absences lasting more than two weeks. When
that threshold i s passed, roughly a quarter have less than 14 additional days of absence, and
about 50 % have less than 42 days.
5. Empirical specification
The number of absence days is an integer variable, suitable for count data modelling.
For each individual we have information on whether s/he had any sickness spells exceeding
two weeks (paid for by the NIA) in a given year, and the length of these spells, if any. This
introduces a censoring problem in our dependent variable, as a zero count may mean anything
between 0 and 14 days. We address the problem by using a two-part, or “hurdle” count model
(Mullahy 1986). The first part consists of a binary response model, and the second of a model
for the number of absence days once the hurdle has been passed. The hurdle model is a
generalisation of ordinary censoring models, where it is assumed that the same process
governs the probability of passing the threshold and the outcome conditional on having passed
it.
Consider first the Poisson regression model. Let Y denote a positive integer random
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regression model is obtained. A restrictive property of the Poisson model is equidispersion,
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is a generalisation of the Poisson which allows the variance to exceed the mean. The
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For the limiting case a = 0, this reduces to the Poisson density. (2) may be derived from the
Poisson by letting  , v m l =  where  v is a random variable. Assuming that  v is gamma
distributed with mean 1 and variance a, it may be integrated out of the distribution of y and v,
and (2) results. This model has  m = ) (Y E  and  ). 1 ( ) var( am m + = Y  In the regression context,
, ' ln ln ln i i i i i v e g m l + = + = z where exp(ei) = vi.
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Hurdle models allow for excess numbers of zeros (or values at some other truncation
point). It is assumed that the probability of having counts greater than zero results from one
process, and positive counts from another process. Consider a hurdle model where both parts
are negative binomial, but with different parameters. Let  ) ( 1 y f  be the negbin density with
parameters  ) , ( 1 1 a m  that governs the probability of having a zero count, Pr(y = 0). Using (2),
we have that
(3)  
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Furthermore, let  ) ( 2 y f be the density function of the second process, which is also a negative
binomial model with parameters  ) , ( 2 2 a m . We obtain Pr(Y = y|Y ‡ 1) by conditioning on
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The hurdle model may be estimated by maximum likelihood. Because  ) , ( 1 1 a m  and
) , ( 2 2 a m are independent by assumption, the ML estimates may be obtained by estimating
each part of the model separately. If we impose the restriction   1 1 = a , equation (3) reduces to
the logit model. That is the approach taken here: First we estimate Pr(Yi – 14 > 0) with a  logit
model, and then we use the zero-truncated negative binomial model to estimate Pr(Yi –14 = yi
– 14 | yi – 14 > 0).
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Note that both parts of the hurdle model may be given a behavioural interpretation: in
the first part a latent variable measures the utility of having at least one long term absence.
What is observed is the binary outcome. In the second part an other latent variable measures
the utility of an additional absence day. Each time a threshold is passed, a new day is added to
the number of absence days.
As a shorthand, let us formulate the expected outcome of each part of the process as
(5) ( ) b , ) ( X F y E = ,
where E(y) is either the probability of absence (logit) or the expected number of absence days
(negative binomial), and X and  b  denote vectors of variables and coefficients. The  s - b
measure how individuals behave or respond when their characteristics vary, while the X
vector represents the individual characteristics. Consider two individuals indexed 0 and 1,
who differ in characteristics as well as response. The difference in outcome is
(6) ). , ( ) , ( ) ( ) (
1 1 0 0 1 0 b b X F X F y E y E - = - = D
For a linear model, i.e. E(y) = bX, (6) may be decomposed as
(7)  ) ( ) (
1 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 b b b b b - + - = - = D X X X X X .
This decomposition, well known from the wage discrimination literature (Blinder 1973,
Oaxaca 1973), has an interesting interpretation: the first part on the r.h.s. expression is the part
of the difference which is caused by difference in characteristics, whereas the second part is
due to difference in behaviour, or response to the characteristics. By estimating the model
separately for “0-type” and “1-type” individuals, (7) may be evaluated at the sample means.
Equation (7) does not hold for the non-linear models used in this paper. However, we
shall perform decompositions as follows,
(8) )}. , ( ) , ( { )} , ( ) , ( { ) , ( ) , (
1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 b b b b b b X F X F X F X F X F X F - + - = - = D12
We interpret these expressions as outlined above. (8) is evaluated by computing the necessary
components for each individual and then averaging.
At the outset we estimate the logit model for the full 1992 and 1995 samples, and
compare the estimated parameter-vectors and the predictions for the two sub-samples.
However, from the benchmark model it may be difficult to discriminate between the
hypothesis that it is the characteristics of the sub-samples that vary, or whether it is the
response to these characteristics that causes differences. Therefore we decompose the changes
in absence probabilities as described, deriving how much of the change that is due to
composition effects, and how much is due to efficiency wage effects. We estimate the model
for the 1992 and the 1995 sample. The hypothesis that 
T T
95 92 b b =  (T denoting “total sample”)
may be tested by a likelihood ratio test. Moreover, even if a likelihood ratio test rejects the
null hypothesis of no behavioural change, this change alone may not be responsible for the
full change in average outcome. The decomposition in (8) allows us to appreciate how much
of D can be attributed to behaviour and characteristics, respectively.
We perform the same exercise for the sub-sample of those individuals that are present
both in the 1992-sample and in the 1995-sample, denoted the common sample. The common
sample is probably more interesting, since it will indicate a possible change of behaviour for
the same workers when conditions change. If the hypothesis that the coefficients are equal
(and the response effect in the decomposition is zero) is rejected, we may conclude that the
behaviour of the individuals has changed over time. Such a result would support an efficiency
wage explanation for absenteeism. We also report how much of the changes that are due to
behaviour and characteristics respectively.
We next compare the ‘marginal workers’ to the ‘non-marginal workers’ both in 1992





- = b b , with  m denoting “marginal” and  n-m ‘non-
marginal’. If the null hypothesis is not rejected, we may conclude that differences in the work
absence for the two samples are due to differences in characteristics, and not due to different
behaviour of the two samples. If we do reject the null hypothesis, we can use (8) to
decompose D and appreciate the importance of composition effects for explaining differences
in the work absence pattern over the business cycle. Note that we evaluate the difference due
to characteristics at the coefficient vector of the non-marginal workers, and the difference due
to behaviour at the characteristics of the marginal workers.13
The discussion has focused on the  logit part of the model. Obviously, the same
exercises may be performed for the truncated negative binomial part. D then refers to the
difference in expected absence days, conditional on the truncation point.
6. Results
The results from the hurdle regressions on the different samples are reported in Tables 3-5.
We have also run the regressions by gender and report those results in Table 3a and so forth.
However, we focus on the regressions in Table 3-5 in the discussion. In Table 6 we show
decompositions as explained in the previous section.
Table 3 contains estimates of absenteeism for the full samples in 1992 and 1995. As
was seen from summary statistics and in accordance with aggregate numbers of absences, the
predicted absence probability decreases from 1992 to 1995. Since unemployment is lower in
1995 than in 1992 the result is contrary to what is expected from theory. It may be due to a
delay in reaction to changes in economic conditions, or the reason may be that long term
sickness absences are not explained by the efficiency wage hypothesis. Looking at the
coefficients for the logit part, we see that there are small differences between the two years.
The coefficient for local unemployment, UNEMPERC, changes sign but it is not significant.
Thus, the cross section results are in general not strongly supportive of an efficiency wage
explanation, contrary to what is found e.g. for Sweden by Johansson and  Palme (1996).
Former sickness, ABSDYS_2, explains absences as expected, with coefficients of 0.0046 in
1992 and 0.0044 in 1995. The income coefficient, INCOME, is positive and significant.
Interestingly, the effect on the number of absence days once absent (Part 2 of the model) is
negative. An explanation for this may be that the percentage of full time workers increase by
income, thus increasing exposure. Once sick, the effect is opposite because high income
workers are more prone to earning efficiency wages.  Spouse’s income and wealth have
opposite signs to own income but the coefficients are smaller. The proxies for ability and
wages, EDUCATIO, EXPERIEN, SENIORITY and PARTTIME have negative signs, except
from experience, which is positive and significant in 1992, Part 1 of the model. This confirms
a conjecture that increased wage rates will reduce demand for absences, i.e. the substitution
effect dominates. The coefficient for number of children, CHILDREN, is positive as was
expected. More children induce more long term absences. However, when considering males
and females separately, we found that the coefficient was actually negative and significant for14
men in 1992 (Part 1), and insignificant in 1995. With the exception of income, the results for
Part 2 are similar for the significant coefficients.
In Table 6 we find that when we decompose the changes from 1992 to 1995 in Part 1
into a composition (characteristics) effect and a behaviour effect, approximately 60% of the
change is due to changes in characteristics.
To investigate the decomposition further, we turn to the common sample, Table 4.
The results are very similar to what we found using the total samples for each year, so that the
coefficient estimates should need no further comments. However, the likelihood ratio tests
show that the coefficients for the 1995 sample are significantly different from the coefficients
in 1992 (both parts). Of most interest are the overall sickness probabilities, which are 0.111 in
1992 and 0.122 in 1995. For this sub-sample of workers who participate both in 1992 and
1995, we find that their sickness probability has increased. These results are as expected when
economic conditions improve. Are the changes due to different behaviour or differences in the
individuals’ background characteristics? Behaviour, i.e. disciplining effects, does matter.
From Table 6 we see that more than 70% of the change in absence probability (0.0082 out of
0.0109) is due to changes in the workers’ behaviour. This is even more pronounced for Part 2.
We find that once sick, the mean number of sickness days increase by 12.1. 11.2 (91%) are
due to changes in behaviour. Thus, a significant share of the increase in sickness absence from
1992 to 1995 for established workers can be explained by an efficiency wage effect, which is
the interpretation of a change in behaviour. The well established workers tend to be more sick
and absent from work when the economy is booming compared to a situation with high
unemployment.
We now turn to the so-called marginal workers, and compare them to the non-
marginal workers. The marginal workers are those who had a loose connection to the labour
market two years back. They were either working very few hours, were unemployed, or were
outside of the work force but not under education.  Contrary to the composition effects
argument, we find that this group has a lower probability of being absent than the reference
group. The coefficients are significantly different (Part 1). When decomposing, we find that
different characteristics explain some 110%  (1992) and 165% (1995)  of the probability
difference. In other words, given the characteristics of the non-marginal workers, the marginal
workers would have more absence than them: the difference due to behaviour is positive.
There is, though, a tendency for the males entering the labour market in 1995, when
unemployment is on its way down, to increase absence probability (Tables 5a and 6). For the
number of sickness days, the picture is less clear. In 1992, marginal workers have less15
absence days than the non-marginal, but there is no difference in 1995. The likelihood ratio
tests do not reject the null hypotheses of equal behaviour between marginal and non-marginal
workers. Comparing marginal workers in 1992 and 1995 in Table 5 (Part 2), we find  an
increase in absence days from 1992 to 1995 for marginal workers, from 64.2 days to 68.5
days, contrary to what is found for non-marginal workers. The decompositions in Table 6
indicates that the relative change between the two groups over time can be ascribed to the
marginal workers changing their behaviour in the direction of longer absences, given their
characteristics. A disciplining effect seems to be working also for the marginal workers: they
are more prone to long absences in boom periods.
7. Concluding remarks.
We have investigated factors which explain sickness absence in Norway. The study is limited
to sickness spells lasting more than two weeks, i.e. spells that are paid for by the Social
Insurance. The data, drawn from the  KIRUT database, include  extensive individual
background information, so we can control for individual characteristics when analysing
sickness absence.
A prime objective was to investigate whether sickness absence is explained primarily
by the disciplinary effects of unemployment, or by composition effects within the labour
force. The disciplinary effects of unemployment are analysed by comparing sickness absences
in 1992 and 1995. Unemployment was high in the first of these years, lower and on its way
down during the latter.  Sickness absence was  slightly  lower in 1995 than in 1992, but
increasing. The behaviour of the workers who participated in both 1992 and 1995 changed,
and such that they for given characteristics have more absences in 1995. The same seems to
hold true for male marginal workers. This gives some support to the hypothesis that
unemployment plays a disciplinary role. The composition effects are analysed by comparing
absenteeism between workers with a longer lasting attachment to the labour force, with
marginal workers. We find that the marginal workers actually have the lowest absence
probability. In aggregate, therefore, our analysis gives no support to the claim that cyclical
variations in sickness absence may be explained by composition effects, or  “marginalised”
workers entering the labour force during an economic upturn. To the contrary, we find that the
“stable” workers – those  who were in the labour force in both periods under study, are the
ones who change behaviour and increase absence. Thus our results provide some support for
the hypothesis that unemployment has a disciplining effect on sickness absence behaviour.16
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 Figure 1. Sickness: Duration and Number of Days per Employee


























































































































Table 1 Sample means
Full Males Females Common Marginal Non-marginal
1992 1995 1992 1995 1992 1995 1992 1995 1992 1995 1992 1995
absdys_2 6.61 5.59 5.43 4.50 7.86 6.74 5.98 6.27 2.23 1.77 7.15 6.07
married 0.56 0.53 0.56 0.52 0.56 0.54 0.56 0.58 0.41 0.37 0.61 0.57
pre_marr 0.11 0.12 0.09 0.10 0.13 0.14 0.11 0.13 0.09 0.09 0.12 0.13
woman 0.49 0.49 0.49 0.49 0.58 0.53 0.48 0.48
age 38.08 38.24 38.06 38.12 38.09 38.37 37.38 40.38 31.21 31.72 39.82 39.91
children 0.39 0.41 0.36 0.36 0.42 0.46 0.41 0.41 0.48 0.46 0.41 0.43
educatio 11.39 11.66 11.58 11.80 11.19 11.52 11.47 11.64 11.50 11.68 11.33 11.60
nonScand 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.01
income 16.88 17.11 20.78 20.72 12.77 13.28 17.32 18.90 10.83 11.77 18.13 18.32
spou_inc 8.86 8.94 5.95 6.02 11.93 12.04 9.16 9.85 7.39 6.97 9.56 9.66
wealth 14.60 16.21 14.00 15.36 15.24 17.12 12.92 17.85 8.23 7.86 15.88 17.70
experien 13.86 14.89 15.71 16.54 11.93 13.14 13.85 16.73 8.36 9.25 15.10 16.19
senority 5.66 6.01 6.12 6.38 5.16 5.62 5.66 7.23 1.10 1.02 6.32 6.73
parttime 0.16 0.16 0.07 0.07 0.25 0.25 0.15 0.13 0.31 0.29 0.13 0.13
unemperc 6.36 5.49 6.36 5.50 6.36 5.48 6.36 5.48 6.43 5.55 6.37 5.49
agrifish
1 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01
salhottr
1 0.26 0.25 0.26 0.25 0.26 0.24 0.25 0.24 0.27 0.24 0.25 0.24
dwelfina
1 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.07 0.08 0.08 0.07 0.08 0.08 0.08
gover_hl
1 0.21 0.21 0.19 0.19 0.23 0.23 0.21 0.22 0.22 0.20 0.21 0.22
healtsoc
1 0.13 0.14 0.04 0.04 0.23 0.25 0.13 0.14 0.20 0.20 0.13 0.14
norway_a
1 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08
norway_e
1 0.15 0.15 0.16 0.16 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.16 0.14 0.15 0.16 0.15
norway_s
1 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.10 0.09 0.09 0.09
norway_w
1 0.20 0.21 0.21 0.21 0.20 0.20 0.21 0.20 0.22 0.20 0.20 0.20
norway_m1 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.13 0.13 0.14 0.14
norway_n
1 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.11 0.11 0.10 0.10
‡1 absence 0.12 0.12 0.10 0.09 0.14 0.14 0.11 0.12 0.11 0.11 0.13 0.12
absence
days 10.6 9.6 9.1 7.6 12.2 11.6 8.0 10.3 8.6 9.0 11.4 10.1
absence
days if ‡1
absence 85.4 82.2 87.2 80.3 84.0 83.6 71.2 83.3 78.3 82.2 86.0 82.7
N 82349 88354 42234 45456 40115 42898 69131 69131 4028 4783 72966 78169
1Dummy variables used in the regressions but not reported20
Table 2 Distribution of absence days net of 14 days (max(absence days-14,0))
1992 1995
All Males Females All Males Females
Freq. % Freq. % Freq. % Freq. % Freq. % Freq. %
£14 2628 25.8 1182 27.02 1446 24.88 2758 27.05 1275 29.85 1483 25.03
15-28 1663 16.33 707 16.16 956 16.45 1634 16.02 703 16.46 931 15.71
29-42 1134 11.13 428 9.79 706 12.15 1148 11.26 455 10.65 693 11.7
43-56 803 7.88 326 7.45 477 8.21 792 7.77 306 7.16 486 8.2
57-70 559 5.49 230 5.26 329 5.66 565 5.54 206 4.82 359 6.06
71-84 478 4.69 194 4.44 284 4.89 532 5.22 184 4.31 348 5.87
85-98 341 3.35 131 2.99 210 3.61 349 3.42 137 3.21 212 3.58
99-112 358 3.51 148 3.38 210 3.61 344 3.37 142 3.32 202 3.41
113-126 234 2.3 104 2.38 130 2.24 263 2.58 117 2.74 146 2.46
127-140 251 2.46 128 2.93 123 2.12 235 2.3 99 2.32 136 2.3
141-210 801 7.86 371 8.48 430 7.4 752 7.37 304 7.12 448 7.56
211-280 549 5.39 248 5.67 301 5.18 480 4.71 200 4.68 280 4.73
281-365 386 3.79 177 4.05 209 3.6 345 3.38 144 3.37 201 3.39
Total 10185 100 4374 100 5811 100 10197 100 4272 100 5925 100
Note: See Table 1 for fraction of  sample with absences21
Table 3 Hurdle regressions for 1992 and 1995 (full samples)
1992 1995
Part 1: Pr(Y>0) (Logit)
Coef. z-value Coef. z-value
absdys_2 0.0077 27.049 0.0074 25.342
married 0.2221 5.310 0.1152 2.817
pre_marr 0.3584 8.682 0.2901 7.338
woman 0.4600 16.161 0.4668 16.863
age 0.0129 7.736 0.0152 8.285
children 0.0481 2.816 0.0987 6.139
educatio -0.1327 -25.179 -0.1170 -22.783
nonScand 0.2036 2.342 0.1588 1.770
income 0.0503 11.668 0.0827 18.125
inc_sqr -0.0010 -10.546 -0.0018 -16.665
spou_inc -0.0071 -5.117 -0.0066 -4.928
wealth -0.0017 -4.112 -0.0041 -9.387
experien 0.0028 1.079 -0.0028 -1.120
senority -0.0125 -5.643 -0.0047 -2.234
parttime -0.2378 -6.574 -0.1700 -4.879
unemperc 0.0065 0.941 -0.0093 -1.192
Constant -1.7636 -17.891 -2.1352 -21.670
Loglikelihood -28820.3 -29595.7
N 82349 88354
Mean predicted 0.1189 0.1154
Part 2: E(Y|Y‡1) (Negative binomial)
Coef. z-value Coef. z-value
absdys_2 0.0023 7.640 0.0026 8.218
married 0.0437 0.978 0.0116 0.266
pre_marr 0.0264 0.613 0.0270 0.648
woman -0.0746 -2.366 0.0099 0.320
age 0.0196 11.023 0.0182 9.115
children 0.0246 1.311 0.0457 2.521
educatio -0.0241 -4.263 -0.0150 -2.634
nonScand 0.1152 1.217 -0.0854 -0.863
income -0.0118 -4.201 -0.0105 -2.780
inc_sqr 0.0001 2.031 0.0001 1.276
spou_inc -0.0050 -3.323 -0.0031 -2.244
wealth 0.0000 -0.011 0.0004 0.821
experien -0.0076 -2.587 -0.0066 -2.317
senority -0.0001 -0.021 -0.0024 -1.038
parttime -0.0177 -0.466 0.0076 0.201
unemperc -0.0048 -0.638 -0.0111 -1.253




Mean predicted 69.5 68.2
Note: Location and sector dummies are used in the regressions but not reported
LR tests b
92 = b
95: Part 1: 71.56 (DF=28) Part 2: 35.22 (DF=29)22
Table 4 Hurdle regressions for common sample
1992 1995
Part 1: Pr(Y>0) (Logit)
abs15yr1 Coef. z-value Coef. z-value
absdys_2 0.0087 25.493 0.0075 23.767
married 0.2372 4.917 0.1581 3.518
pre_marr 0.3861 8.181 0.2872 6.623
woman 0.4958 15.156 0.4822 15.500
age 0.0074 3.584 0.0137 6.795
children 0.0378 1.962 0.0857 4.747
educatio -0.1314 -21.723 -0.1146 -20.366
nonScand 0.1359 1.286 0.3018 2.818
income 0.0464 9.212 0.0739 13.360
inc_sqr -0.0009 -8.403 -0.0016 -13.224
spou_inc -0.0068 -4.245 -0.0076 -5.210
wealth -0.0017 -3.364 -0.0041 -8.691
experien 0.0058 1.869 -0.0027 -0.954
senority -0.0121 -4.583 -0.0034 -1.505
parttime -0.2302 -5.497 -0.1236 -3.109
unemperc 0.0083 1.048 -0.0088 -1.015
Constant -1.7083 -14.989 -2.0583 -17.821
Loglikelihood -22657.8 -24129.8
N 69131 69131
Mean predicted 0.1113 0.1223
Part 2: E(Y|Y‡1) (Negative binomial)
Coef. z-value Coef. z-value
0.0025 6.979 0.0027 8.086
married 0.0531 1.026 0.0344 0.719
pre_marr 0.0658 1.319 0.0562 1.222
woman -0.0135 -0.366 0.0150 0.435
age 0.0118 5.209 0.0179 8.249
children 0.0314 1.461 0.0402 1.992
educatio -0.0190 -2.910 -0.0105 -1.691
nonScand 0.1511 1.293 -0.0974 -0.836
income -0.0066 -2.120 -0.0146 -2.558
inc_sqr 0.0000 1.458 0.0001 1.029
spou_inc -0.0045 -2.543 -0.0038 -2.605
wealth -0.0003 -0.890 0.0004 0.847
experien -0.0035 -1.037 -0.0071 -2.241
senority -0.0009 -0.303 -0.0032 -1.300
parttime -0.0913 -2.051 0.0037 0.086
unemperc -0.0060 -0.679 -0.0132 -1.360




Mean predicted 57.3 69.4
Note: Location and sector dummies are used in the regressions but not reported
LR tests b
92 = b
95: Part 1: 64.27 (DF=28) Part 2: 103.93 (DF=29)23
Table 5 Hurdle regressions for marginal and non-marginal samples
1992 1995
Non-marginal Marginal Non-marginal Marginal
Part 1: Pr(Y>0) (Logit)
Coef. z-value Coef. z-value Coef. z-value Coef. z-value
absdys_2 0.0076 26.079 0.0170 4.793 0.0073 24.414 0.0209 5.660
married 0.2064 4.838 0.3892 1.970 0.0914 2.178 0.5241 2.923
pre_marr 0.3204 7.612 0.6544 3.348 0.2569 6.341 0.6448 3.720
woman 0.4410 14.914 0.4450 3.240 0.4717 16.306 0.3114 2.562
age 0.0105 6.117 0.0100 1.116 0.0143 7.553 -0.0081 -0.849
children 0.0115 0.643 0.1123 1.602 0.0816 4.836 0.0259 0.385
educatio -0.1259 -23.156 -0.1285 -4.921 -0.1109 -20.857 -0.1133 -4.794
nonScand 0.1965 2.143 -0.0399 -0.132 0.1940 2.071 -0.4249 -1.215
income 0.0333 7.498 0.1357 5.413 0.0759 15.372 0.0219 2.224
inc_sqr -0.0007 -7.461 -0.0035 -4.424 -0.0017 -14.917 -0.0001 -0.743
spou_inc -0.0083 -5.799 -0.0022 -0.340 -0.0071 -5.148 -0.0080 -1.219
wealth -0.0014 -3.602 -0.0099 -2.809 -0.0040 -8.976 -0.0081 -2.641
experien 0.0037 1.377 0.0026 0.200 -0.0025 -0.947 0.0146 1.209
senority -0.0121 -5.400 0.0424 0.545 -0.0041 -1.922 0.2366 3.304
parttime -0.2062 -5.346 -0.2979 -2.231 -0.1517 -4.067 -0.3063 -2.447
unemperc 0.0054 0.748 -0.0197 -0.632 -0.0119 -1.459 -0.0021 -0.063
Constant -1.5055 -14.451 -2.0704 -4.398 -2.0521 -19.525 -1.3641 -3.182
Loglikelihood -26747.8 -1284.1 -27221.6 -1549.6
N 72966 4028 78169 4783
Mean predicted 0.1312 0.1095 0.1213 0.1089
Part 2: E(Y|Y‡1) (Negative binomial)
Coef. z-value Coef. z-value Coef. z-value Coef. z-value
absdys_2 0.0024 7.692 -0.0029 -0.920 0.0026 7.994 0.0022 0.619
married 0.0397 0.857 0.0450 0.238 0.0041 0.092 0.2329 1.140
pre_marr 0.0210 0.475 0.1364 0.638 0.0231 0.535 0.1592 0.878
woman -0.0826 -2.532 0.1079 0.670 0.0063 0.196 -0.0507 -0.361
age 0.0203 11.156 -0.0038 -0.407 0.0179 8.730 0.0136 1.166
children 0.0244 1.245 -0.0340 -0.440 0.0432 2.294 0.0169 0.203
educatio -0.0227 -3.902 -0.0310 -1.046 -0.0124 -2.114 -0.0378 -1.293
nonScand 0.1027 1.034 0.2749 0.814 -0.0400 -0.388 -0.8970 -2.181
income -0.0134 -4.432 -0.0212 -0.698 -0.0145 -2.881 0.0047 0.364
inc_sqr 0.0001 2.132 0.0005 0.532 0.0001 1.249 0.0000 -0.029
spou_inc -0.0051 -3.257 -0.0043 -0.804 -0.0031 -2.212 -0.0088 -1.047
wealth 0.0000 -0.113 0.0007 0.371 0.0005 0.974 -0.0001 -0.049
experien -0.0083 -2.755 0.0292 2.047 -0.0062 -2.090 -0.0163 -1.119
senority -0.0003 -0.114 0.0814 0.862 -0.0020 -0.852 0.1147 1.368
parttime -0.0236 -0.587 0.0559 0.366 -0.0042 -0.105 0.0529 0.382
unemperc -0.0065 -0.824 0.0236 0.700 -0.0127 -1.392 0.0284 0.671
Constant 3.9882 38.349 4.1648 7.843 3.8845 35.084 3.9269 8.259
alpha 1.4031 1.3236 1.4444 1.3495
Loglikelihood -49861.0 -2242.7 -49004.8 -2690.5
N 9570 441 9485 521
Mean predicted 72.1 64.2 68.7 68.5
Note: Location and sector dummies are used in the regressions but not reported
LR tests b
non-marg= b
marg : Part 1, 1992: 67.00 (DF=28) Part 2, 1992: 30.22 (DF=29)
Part 1, 1995: 78.53 (DF=28) Part 2, 1995: 27.65 (DF=29)24
Table 3a Hurdle regressions for 1992 and 1995 Males (full sample)
1992 1995
Part 1: Pr(Y>0) (Logit)
Coef. z-value Coef. z-value
absdys_2 0.0085 19.011 0.0077 16.806
married 0.2440 3.772 0.0885 1.356
pre_marr 0.3428 5.219 0.2674 4.231
age 0.0186 6.196 0.0165 4.742
children -0.0871 -3.047 0.0161 0.583
educatio -0.1385 -17.552 -0.1277 -16.080
nonScand 0.2896 2.450 0.1223 0.954
income 0.0181 3.226 0.0526 8.496
inc_sqr -0.0004 -3.958 -0.0012 -9.263
spou_inc -0.0107 -3.629 -0.0117 -3.895
wealth -0.0020 -3.105 -0.0028 -4.286
experien 0.0015 0.293 -0.0002 -0.032
senority -0.0157 -5.161 -0.0078 -2.678
parttime -0.5429 -5.741 -0.3008 -3.538
unemperc 0.0170 1.613 0.0100 0.830
Constant -1.5268 -10.729 -1.7338 -11.752
Loglikelihood -13091.1 -13289.0
N 42234 45456
Mean predicted 0.1036 0.0940
Part 2: E(Y|Y‡1) (Negative binomial)
Coef. z-value Coef. z-value
absdys_2 0.0023 4.954 0.0025 4.760
married 0.1161 1.637 0.0921 1.254
pre_marr 0.1017 1.446 0.1408 2.007
age 0.0260 8.048 0.0277 7.016
children -0.0390 -1.252 0.0107 0.337
educatio -0.0194 -2.178 -0.0132 -1.402
nonScand -0.0865 -0.651 -0.3199 -2.176
income -0.0116 -3.199 -0.0145 -2.595
inc_sqr 0.0001 1.893 0.0001 1.625
spou_inc -0.0087 -2.593 -0.0078 -2.295
wealth 0.0000 -0.070 0.0014 1.948
experien -0.0133 -2.328 -0.0158 -2.749
senority -0.0043 -1.318 -0.0077 -2.328
parttime 0.0071 0.068 0.0828 0.853
unemperc -0.0057 -0.473 -0.0242 -1.728




Mean predicted 73.3 66.4
Note: Location and sector dummies are used in the regressions but not reported
LR tests b
92 = b
95: Part 1: 34.73 (DF=27) Part 2: 29.23 (DF=28)25
Table 3b Hurdle regressions for 1992 and 1995 Females (full sample)
1992 1995
Part 1: Pr(Y>0) (Logit)
Coef. z-value Coef. z-value
absdys_2 0.0070 18.853 0.0071 18.691
married 0.3232 5.604 0.2500 4.501
pre_marr 0.4193 7.740 0.3421 6.658
age 0.0121 5.744 0.0166 7.326
children 0.1534 6.881 0.1667 8.078
educatio -0.1218 -16.559 -0.1037 -14.858
nonScand 0.0718 0.540 0.1537 1.193
income 0.1165 13.708 0.1359 16.297
inc_sqr -0.0029 -10.480 -0.0034 -12.673
spou_inc -0.0089 -5.248 -0.0084 -5.142
wealth -0.0015 -2.929 -0.0052 -8.761
experien -0.0071 -2.118 -0.0106 -3.307
senority -0.0060 -1.831 0.0012 0.383
parttime -0.1272 -3.182 -0.1153 -2.983
unemperc -0.0030 -0.321 -0.0250 -2.404
Constant -1.8379 -13.040 -2.2849 -16.492
Loglikelihood -15626.2 -16204.7
N 40115 42898
Mean predicted 0.1449 0.1381
Part 2: E(Y|Y‡1) (Negative binomial)
Coef. z-value Coef. z-value
absdys_2 0.0023 5.983 0.0026 6.510
married 0.0342 0.567 -0.0196 -0.348
pre_marr 0.0150 0.269 -0.0254 -0.481
age 0.0160 7.174 0.0157 6.560
children 0.0520 2.168 0.0544 2.417
educatio -0.0332 -4.411 -0.0188 -2.546
nonScand 0.2817 2.006 0.0265 0.195
income -0.0149 -2.270 0.0066 0.946
inc_sqr 0.0002 1.387 -0.0004 -2.162
spou_inc -0.0046 -2.588 -0.0021 -1.311
wealth 0.0001 0.151 -0.0003 -0.489
experien -0.0088 -2.461 -0.0086 -2.480
senority 0.0060 1.662 0.0036 1.116
parttime -0.0208 -0.493 0.0178 0.430
unemperc -0.0038 -0.398 -0.0025 -0.223




Mean predicted 70.0 69.6
Note: Location and sector dummies are used in the regressions but not reported
LR tests b
92 = b
95: Part 1: 44.98 (DF=27)  Part 2: 26.35 (DF=28)26
Table 4a  Hurdle regressions for common sample (males)
1992 1995
Part 1: Pr(Y>0) (Logit)
Coef. z-value Coef. z-value
absdys_2 0.0096 17.574 0.0080 15.750
married 0.2736 3.647 0.2106 2.918
pre_marr 0.3462 4.533 0.3223 4.568
age 0.0064 1.583 0.0161 4.129
children -0.0712 -2.236 -0.0192 -0.628
educatio -0.1422 -15.187 -0.1247 -14.216
nonScand 0.2110 1.450 0.2059 1.340
income 0.0023 0.386 0.0524 6.586
inc_sqr -0.0001 -1.423 -0.0012 -7.764
spou_inc -0.0110 -3.208 -0.0138 -4.286
wealth -0.0013 -1.567 -0.0028 -3.886
experien 0.0134 2.107 -0.0040 -0.687
senority -0.0122 -3.332 -0.0053 -1.690
parttime -0.4924 -4.408 -0.1508 -1.428
unemperc 0.0246 2.020 0.0138 1.016
Constant -1.2265 -7.369 -1.7735 -10.074
Loglikelihood -10119.0 -10591.2
N 35473 35473
Mean predicted 0.0907 0.0967
Part 2: E(Y|Y‡1) (Negative binomial)
Coef. z-value Coef. z-value
absdys_2 0.0029 4.879 0.0028 4.757
married 0.1245 1.481 0.0983 1.191
pre_marr 0.1236 1.490 0.1872 2.368
age 0.0121 2.677 0.0290 6.584
children -0.0361 -1.032 0.0285 0.806
educatio -0.0039 -0.363 -0.0107 -1.029
nonScand 0.1810 1.059 -0.3603 -2.069
income -0.0094 -2.185 -0.0243 -2.576
inc_sqr 0.0001 1.672 0.0002 1.577
spou_inc -0.0092 -2.308 -0.0079 -2.188
wealth -0.0001 -0.167 0.0018 2.138
experien 0.0005 0.070 -0.0181 -2.701
senority -0.0079 -1.884 -0.0060 -1.656
parttime 0.0032 0.026 0.1120 0.924
unemperc -0.0057 -0.400 -0.0292 -1.831




Mean predicted 57.7 67.0
Note: Location and sector dummies are used in the regressions but not reported
LR tests b
92 = b
95: Part 1: 54.13 (DF=27) Part 2: 43.59 (DF=28)27
Table 4b  Hurdle regressions for common sample (females)
1992 1995
Part 1: Pr(Y>0) (Logit)
Coef. z-value Coef. z-value
absdys_2 0.0078 17.954 0.0071 17.714
married 0.3111 4.694 0.2368 3.902
pre_marr 0.4389 7.167 0.3099 5.549
age 0.0105 4.083 0.0159 6.444
children 0.1328 5.256 0.1687 7.208
educatio -0.1125 -13.577 -0.1050 -13.803
nonScand 0.0497 0.315 0.3365 2.197
income 0.1351 13.044 0.1143 11.699
inc_sqr -0.0035 -10.387 -0.0028 -9.417
spou_inc -0.0081 -4.071 -0.0082 -4.677
wealth -0.0020 -3.144 -0.0051 -8.118
experien -0.0070 -1.835 -0.0099 -2.838
senority -0.0088 -2.316 0.0006 0.175
parttime -0.1081 -2.347 -0.0948 -2.187
unemperc -0.0046 -0.437 -0.0271 -2.376
Constant -2.0470 -12.569 -2.0742 -12.960
Loglikelihood -12444.4 -13468.5
N 33658 33658
Mean predicted 0.1331 0.1492
Part 2: E(Y|Y‡1) (Negative binomial)
Coef. z-value Coef. z-value
absdys_2 0.0021 4.866 0.0026 6.380
married 0.0250 0.362 0.0113 0.185
pre_marr 0.0314 0.490 0.0032 0.055
age 0.0115 4.199 0.0149 5.786
children 0.0806 2.878 0.0362 1.432
educatio -0.0319 -3.764 -0.0144 -1.797
nonScand 0.1391 0.832 0.0140 0.088
income 0.0059 0.563 -0.0014 -0.164
inc_sqr -0.0002 -0.644 -0.0002 -0.948
spou_inc -0.0037 -1.780 -0.0029 -1.746
wealth -0.0006 -0.866 -0.0004 -0.658
experien -0.0081 -1.967 -0.0085 -2.276
senority 0.0070 1.661 0.0002 0.073
parttime -0.0884 -1.763 0.0159 0.342
unemperc -0.0083 -0.744 -0.0033 -0.267




Mean predicted 57.0 71.3
Note: Location and sector dummies are used in the regressions but not reported
LR tests b
92 = b
95: Part 1: 52.26 (DF=27) Part 2: 92.08 (DF=28)28
Table 5a Hurdle regressions for marginal and non-marginal samples (males)
1992 1995
Non-marginal Marginal Non-marginal Marginal
Part 1: Pr(Y>0) (Logit)
Coef. z-value Coef. z-value Coef. z-value Coef. z-value
absdys_2 0.0083 18.226 0.0179 2.794 0.0076 16.329 0.0237 4.209
married 0.2540 3.882 0.5350 1.388 0.0914 1.366 0.2099 0.691
pre_marr 0.3409 5.121 0.4512 1.275 0.2611 4.017 0.3854 1.420
age 0.0184 6.054 -0.0025 -0.116 0.0158 4.424 0.0121 0.635
children -0.1041 -3.564 -0.0719 -0.452 0.0086 0.302 0.0082 0.057
educatio -0.1350 -16.758 -0.1309 -2.841 -0.1212 -14.827 -0.1671 -4.288
nonScand 0.2343 1.897 0.2514 0.517 0.1461 1.098 -0.5794 -1.034
income 0.0057 1.029 0.1064 2.669 0.0491 7.217 0.0255 2.018
inc_sqr -0.0002 -2.217 -0.0030 -2.712 -0.0012 -8.517 -0.0001 -0.726
spou_inc -0.0111 -3.735 -0.0031 -0.166 -0.0117 -3.853 -0.0121 -0.709
wealth -0.0017 -2.703 -0.0309 -2.862 -0.0026 -4.008 -0.0057 -1.230
experien -0.0024 -0.459 0.0437 1.451 -0.0004 -0.071 -0.0045 -0.188
senority -0.0148 -4.843 0.0220 0.165 -0.0065 -2.194 0.1881 1.684
parttime -0.3810 -3.663 -0.3908 -1.243 -0.2421 -2.518 -0.3362 -1.384
unemperc 0.0165 1.519 -0.0238 -0.447 0.0064 0.513 0.0133 0.257
Constant -1.3078 -8.849 -1.9597 -2.367 -1.6947 -10.781 -1.0049 -1.479
Loglikelihood -12314.7 -456.2 -12238.5 -673.2
N 38154 1708 40685 2254
Mean predicted 0.1090 0.0872 0.0974 0.0998
Part 2: E(Y|Y‡1) (Negative binomial)
Coef. z-value Coef. z-value Coef. z-value Coef. z-value
absdys_2 0.0025 5.252 -0.0048 -0.712 0.0025 4.662 0.0063 1.209
married 0.1038 1.432 0.3892 0.961 0.0600 0.781 0.6197 1.937
pre_marr 0.1022 1.427 -0.0984 -0.243 0.1242 1.699 0.2269 0.791
age 0.0266 8.166 -0.0122 -0.706 0.0284 7.055 -0.0194 -0.820
children -0.0409 -1.287 -0.0299 -0.168 0.0209 0.642 -0.3628 -2.017
educatio -0.0171 -1.893 -0.0929 -1.417 -0.0122 -1.262 0.0567 1.112
nonScand -0.0688 -0.499 -0.3137 -0.483 -0.2781 -1.823 -1.0666 -1.652
income -0.0131 -3.460 0.0014 0.029 -0.0211 -2.679 -0.0303 -1.643
inc_sqr 0.0001 2.012 0.0000 0.001 0.0002 1.661 0.0003 1.667
spou_inc -0.0087 -2.587 -0.0299 -1.188 -0.0079 -2.260 0.0088 0.512
wealth 0.0000 0.020 -0.0222 -2.058 0.0015 2.091 -0.0012 -0.264
experien -0.0133 -2.268 0.0454 1.671 -0.0161 -2.708 0.0179 0.588
senority -0.0044 -1.333 0.2112 1.255 -0.0070 -2.085 0.0285 0.230
parttime -0.0016 -0.014 -0.0646 -0.163 0.0721 0.655 0.2433 0.876
unemperc -0.0076 -0.615 0.0577 0.902 -0.0232 -1.590 -0.0085 -0.128
Constant 3.7624 24.885 4.4086 4.364 3.8233 21.931 4.3003 5.446
alpha 1.4508 1.1535 1.5417 1.2362
Loglikelihood -21694.7 -753.3 -20278.4 -1155.8
N 4157 149 3964 225
Mean predicted 73.9 66.6 66.9 68.6
Note: Location and sector dummies are used in the regressions but not reported
LR tests b
non-marg= b
marg : Part 1, 1992: 43.85 (DF=27) Part 2, 1992: 31.90 (DF=28)
Part 1, 1995: 52.79 (DF=27) Part 2, 1995: 24.65 (DF=28)29
Table 5b Hurdle regressions for marginal and non-marginal samples (females)
1992 1995
Non-marginal Marginal Non-marginal Marginal
Part 1: Pr(Y>0) (Logit)
z-value Coef. z-value Coef. z-value Coef. z-value z
absdys_2 0.0069 18.349 0.0176 3.991 0.0069 17.987 0.0183 3.687
married 0.2914 4.901 0.2914 1.183 0.1887 3.303 0.9557 3.857
pre_marr 0.3756 6.757 0.6299 2.605 0.2926 5.556 0.9080 3.942
age 0.0097 4.457 0.0153 1.493 0.0162 6.905 -0.0055 -0.472
children 0.1130 4.727 0.1741 2.147 0.1464 6.654 0.0306 0.384
educatio -0.1163 -15.210 -0.1217 -3.706 -0.1001 -13.832 -0.0575 -1.821
nonScand 0.0659 0.464 -0.1193 -0.292 0.1983 1.463 -0.4303 -0.936
income 0.0932 10.389 0.1696 4.252 0.1226 13.803 0.1469 3.701
inc_sqr -0.0023 -8.142 -0.0047 -2.927 -0.0030 -10.986 -0.0050 -3.157
spou_inc -0.0095 -5.440 -0.0008 -0.110 -0.0080 -4.808 -0.0164 -1.966
wealth -0.0013 -2.561 -0.0060 -1.773 -0.0050 -8.430 -0.0088 -2.173
experien -0.0054 -1.602 -0.0256 -1.584 -0.0106 -3.213 0.0064 0.395
senority -0.0063 -1.907 0.0690 0.706 0.0008 0.259 0.2111 2.209
parttime -0.1116 -2.628 -0.2543 -1.687 -0.1069 -2.608 -0.2194 -1.461
unemperc -0.0041 -0.424 -0.0216 -0.557 -0.0269 -2.498 -0.0098 -0.210
Constant -1.5761 -10.444 -1.8177 -2.973 -2.1361 -14.452 -2.6486 -4.148
Loglikelihood -14347.6 -815.1 -14903.8 -855.0
N 34812 2320 37484 2529
Mean predicted 0.1555 0.1259 0.1473 0.1170
Part 2: E(Y|Y‡1) (Negative binomial)
Coef. z Coef. z Coef. z Coef. z
absdys_2 0.0023 5.766 -0.0007 -0.178 0.0025 6.313 0.0004 0.078
married 0.0385 0.606 0.0028 0.012 -0.0078 -0.134 -0.1430 -0.474
pre_marr 0.0030 0.051 0.3099 1.199 -0.0166 -0.304 -0.1188 -0.480
age 0.0164 7.124 -0.0024 -0.221 0.0147 5.998 0.0210 1.475
children 0.0544 2.133 -0.0697 -0.797 0.0470 1.984 0.1328 1.423
educatio -0.0329 -4.209 0.0104 0.288 -0.0153 -2.018 -0.0924 -2.427
nonScand 0.2614 1.750 0.7257 1.605 0.0675 0.475 -0.6590 -1.249
income -0.0179 -2.487 -0.0008 -0.016 0.0013 0.165 0.0314 0.756
inc_sqr 0.0003 1.619 -0.0007 -0.388 -0.0003 -1.589 -0.0005 -0.342
spou_inc -0.0051 -2.703 -0.0024 -0.386 -0.0022 -1.396 -0.0072 -0.660
wealth 0.0000 -0.105 0.0009 0.439 -0.0003 -0.482 0.0014 0.401
experien -0.0097 -2.652 0.0283 1.533 -0.0075 -2.123 -0.0282 -1.524
senority 0.0060 1.640 0.0922 0.743 0.0037 1.135 0.2141 1.862
parttime -0.0265 -0.597 0.1608 0.938 0.0087 0.198 -0.0697 -0.401
unemperc -0.0057 -0.564 0.0008 0.021 -0.0063 -0.537 0.0211 0.393
Constant 4.1548 28.149 3.9548 5.796 3.8453 26.012 3.9699 5.485
alpha 1.3516 1.2909 1.3639 1.2847
Loglikelihood -28138.7 -1477.2 -28695.5 -1519.8
N 5413 292 5521 296
Mean predicted 70.8 63.4 70.0 69.1
Note: Location and sector dummies are used in the regressions but not reported
LR tests b
non-marg= b
marg : Part 1, 1992:  39.34 (DF=27) Part 2, 1992: 26.72 (DF=28)
Part 1, 1995:  43.25 (DF=27) Part 2, 1995: 29.64 (DF=28)30

















































-0.2 -0.2 (-) 1.6 1.6 (-) -1.0 -1.0 (-)
Notes:  Part 1: Pr(Y>0) Part 2: E(Y|Y>0)
Non-rejection of  
1 0 b b =  is interpreted as Total difference = Difference due to characteristics31
Table A1 LR test for equal coefficients males and females
Part 1 (logit) Part 2 (negbin)
Full sample 1992 206.0 50.6
                    1995 205.4 64.4
Common sample 1992 188.8 26.4
                             1995 140.2 63.6
Non-marginal 1992 171.0 55.2
                       1995 25.6 24.4
Marginal 1992 158.6 61.8
               1995 42.8 29.0
DF= 27 for part 1, 28 for part 2 with critical values 40.1 and 41.3 (5%)